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II.—"THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHARACTER."1
BY W. E. BOTCE GIBSON.
T H E main value of Mr. Shand's latest contribution to
Ethology or the Science of Character1 is that it sets the
science on a sound progressive basis. " To make real pro-
gress possible," says the author in his Preface, " has been my
»im throughout." " I have wondered whether, in following a
plain method of science and common sense in the treat-
ment of a subject around which an amount of valuable
opinion has accumulated, we cannot ensure an orderly de-
velopment ; BO that each age, taking up the conclusions of
the preceding age, not contemptuously, but with respect and
hope, may first master its knowledge and wisdom, and dis-
cern their legitimate applications, before attempting to judge
in what respects they are defective and inadequate: just as
the progress of physical science depends on our first master-
ing the knowledge already attained in some branch of it,
and on conserving that, before attempting to solve the new
problems there suggested." Mr. Shand has carried these fine
precepts into practice. He has read widely both along the
highways and the byways of literature, and has made a
special study of the French classics and Ethical writers.
And yet, as our author confesses with regret, it is not
often that a maxim or proverb or flash of psychological
insight is stated with sufficient precision or sufficiently pro-
tected by qualifying limitations to serve even as a provisional
hypothesis concerning the roots of character, something that
criticism could improve upon and not simply crush out of
existence. The work of expressing the garnered material
in sound provisional form, of setting the products of tradi-
tional insight into the framework of a new set of ideas, and
of formulating with precision nearly 150 laws of mind—all
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this is pioneer's work on the author's part, and undoubtedly
work of striking originality and substantial value.
But it is not only in respect of material that our author
seeks to connect his insight with that of the best tradition,
he follows the Bame policy in respect of his general method.
Here the writer to whom he is most indebted is John Stuart
MilL The main features of the method which Mill proposes
for bringing science into the study of character may be stated
as follows. In the first place we are to gather from history,
literature and personal observation as many generalisations
as possible concerning ethical and political wisdom. These
he calls empirical laws, since they are harvested from the
field of experience and from the observation of particular
instances. As samples we may cite " Democracies tend to
change into despotisms," or " Kevolutions always begin in
hunger," "Love is blind," or "Prudence is the mother of
all the virtues". The next step in the application of thiB
ethological method is to make a systematic inventory of a
new set of laws, the laws of mind ; for, as Mill insists, the
Science of Character must ultimately rest on the Laws of
Psychology. Into the precise nature of this inventory we
need not enter. It will be enough to point out in the first
place that for Mill the supreme laws of mind are the lawB
of Association, and that the tendency of one experience to
associate with its immediate neighbour in time or space, or
to attract to itself all experiences similar to its own, is the
ultimate tendency of our human nature ; and, secondly, that
these ultimate laws of mind were held by Mill to be too
abstract to be immediately applicable to cases of conduct.
Hence from these fundamental laws, other less abstract
laws must be inferred, and it is these secondary laws of
mind which are to furnish the more immediate basis for
the new science of character. We thus reach the third
and the essential step in the application of the method.
This lies in deducing the first set of laws from the second^
the empirical laws from the laws of mind. All laws of
mind express universal tendencies of our nature: they hold
good of the human mind as such and are vouched for, in last
resort, by fundamental principles of Psychology. Such laws
form a firm basis for a general science of character. And if
we can deduce the empirical laws from them as special cases,
we shall have given to these laws the best proof of their
soundness that the case admits of. If we can show that
the blindness of love follows inevitably from the way in •
which our emotions and sentiments act and interact in
virtue of their own innate tendencies, or still better, if we
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can show within what limits and under what conditions the
interactions of our sentiments bring about love's blindness,
we shall have connected experience with reason, and brought
systematic science into the obscure realm of character and
conduct.
The method which Mr. Shand adopts for his purpose is a
modified form of the method of Mill. It starts from the re-
cognition that the main duty of the ethologist to-day is to
seek out and fix the laws of mind. From time to time our
author will take up an individual case, that of Lucy Ashton
in Scott's Bride of Lamm&rmoor, or that of Eugenie Grandet
in Balzac's novel, and he will shed the light of his laws of
mind on their character and behaviour; from time to time
again he will take up a striking maxim or shrewd reflexion
about human nature, sift it, interpret it, limit it and refer it
for its explanation to the laws of mind. But it is these laws
of mind themselves which are his chief preoccupation. To
get back to the roots of conduct as the bases of character, to
the primary emotions and sentiments, and to define the laws
to which their innate tendencies conform, this is his main
endeavour.
The Science of Character, however, must not only be Bet
on the right basis: the manner of its establishment must be
such that all who come after may be able to profit by the
work done. It takes more than one to fashion a science,
and science is essentially a social interest To pave the way
is as important as to strike the track. It is therefore an
essential part of our author's purpose to state the laws of
mind in a provisional yet definite form, in a form which at
once challenges the successor to complete or rather carry on
his work, and by its very definiteness exposes its own errors,
points the way of advance, and gives the requisite direction.
Every careful thinker should strive so to state his results-
that other thinkers can take up his work at the point at
which he leaves i t " Thus the laws of mind," we read,
" on which we are to base the science of character, can
only be provisional and approximate in the first instance.
Still, even as such, the discovery of them, their precise
enunciation, their comparison one with another, the gradual
accumulation of a great number of them, will be a useful
achievement and an essential part of our task. Being pre-
cisely expressed, their errors will be sooner brought to Tight;
they will be a guide to future research. When a sufficient
number of them are brought together and compared, some
may be found to throw light on others. They should help us
to discern and interpret the ' empirical laws' of character,
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and when both are in harmony the evidence for each will be
strengthened. Such provisional laws, notwithstanding their
defects, will be a necessary stage in the development of a
science of character, and will constitute the working assump-
tions on which its future advance will be dependent. But
the great and initial problem is to give them such a form
that they can be adopted by others, and become the base of
a progressive development.
The first and the most fundamental of the laws of mind is
thus enunciated by our author: "Mental activity tends, at
first unconsciously, afterwards consciously, to produce and
to Bustain system and organisation ". More briefly, but less
precisely, the mind has an inveterate tendency to organise
its activity: it tends always to organise its process. System,
organisation is thus the master-key to the new science, and
nothing mental can be properly understood save as an
•organised whole.
In this initial position there is more than can be made
plain all at once. We are apt to identify system with routine,
and organisation with the repression of individuality. We
think of a complex machine fitted to go one way and one way
only. We think of its pitilessness, its remorselessness, its
obstinate mechanical persistency. And we rebel at the idea
that the main function and destiny of mental activity, the
very hearth and home of our freedom, should be to stiffen
into system and bureaucratic precision: " faultily faultless,
splendidly null, dead perfection, no more". But if this is
our view of a mental system we think in haste. Let us
collect ourselves and remember that mind is something very
much alive, so much so that many of us believe it will out-
live the body. A living system, a vital organisation, plastic
at every point, this is very different from the machines that
grind our corn or turn paste into chocolate. To realise how
living and forceful a system may be, how plastic and how
adjustable, we have but to cast our eye on that living machine,
"the human body. Being a living machine it is a machine in
«very part, a system of machines so wonderful that at every
.stage of its development it remains in perfect working order.
Even the minute germ-cell out of which the whole body
develops is itself an immensely intricate machine But it
is alive and the producer of living bodies. In moving towards
its own ends it shows exquisite power of adjustment and can
-within limits regenerate its own lost tissua Take the little
animal system called Clavellina: cut it into two, and dis-
carding such trifles as the heart and stomach leave the
.residuum to grow forward as it may. With what result?
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A vast and silent readjustment will set in, and the mutilated
fragment will very shortly prove that life is the greatest of
all magicians by emerging from the struggle a perfect little
Clavellina. And if this is simply the machine that lives,
what may not be the plasticity, the moulding and regenerat-
ing power of the system that thinks and feels f Psychologists
know how dehcately complex is that little cell of the mind
they call an interest-process,—just a want or a need and the
activity which sets about to satisfy it. All the mysteries of
instinct, emotion and purposive effort are locked in that
simple experience, a vast array of forces inter-organised in
definite ways according to definite laws, but all the laws
laws of tendencies only, and the tendencies inwardly directed
by the common end towards which all the functions of all
the parts converge. And think again of the still more
deeply vital systems in which the ends of all the lesser
systems are interorganised to meet the deeper requirements of
a larger and more inclusive life, and at the heart of all, the
great ideals of our freedom: beauty, truth and virtue, and
the sublime claim which they make to re-organise and re-
direct to their own far ends all the lesser systems, spiritual
and corporeal of our immensely complex life.
If we drink from these wells of truth and nurse our imagina-
tion on the vitalities of such systems as these, we shall, I
think, be more disposed to connect indissolubly in our minds-
the two sister-notions of organisation and mental life, and
when we learn that the first law of mind is that mental
activity always makes for its own organisation, and that
every mental unit, every emotion and every instinct is an
organised system and must be -understood as such if ever it
is to be subdued to higher ends,—we shall be prepared to-
follow our author into the detail of his treatment without
suspecting him at every turn of sacrificing individuality to-
organisation or vitality to system.
The foundation on which our characters are built up is-
the system of the primary emotions and appetites. These
primary emotions are at least six in number: fear, anger,
disgust, curiosity, sorrow and joy; and of the primary ap-
petites two at least are conspicuously fundamental: hunger
and sex. These emotions and appetites are known to be
primary since they satisfy one or more of the following
tests: manifestation in the first months of child-life and in
behaviour of a genuinely instinctive kind, wide diffusion over
the animal world, and irreducibility on analysis to anything
more primitive (p. 219). These tests are also satisfied by
certain primary impulses, more particularly the impulse for
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exercise and the impulse for repose. These must therefore
be classed with the primary, appetites and emotions among
" those fundamental forces of character, without a know-
ledge of which it were in vain to attempt to understand its
later and more complex developments " (p. 29).
Now each of these primary forceps is an organised system.
It is indeed an abstract Psychology which discerns " in emo-
tion only feeling, in an impulse only (Wation, and in other
states only cognition " (p. 29). We must in fact distinguish
between the functional unit that has sufficient complexity to
stand, relatively speaking, alone, and the mere fragments or
aspects of that unit which can be isolated from it only in
thought. We are accustomed to the notion that the con-
crete unit of knowledge is the proposition or judgment, and
that the term or clause which is its element is not a unit of
knowledge but only an abstract element of it distinguishable
in thought from the proposition but not capable by itself of
serving as a foundation for knowledge. So in an emotional
system we shall find various factors, and these we may con-
ceive in abstraction from the system they serve, but if we do
this, let us remember that they are abstractions and that
everything which is not an organised system is an abstrac-
tion from the life of mind and not a vital mental unit itself.
Now the terms ' instinct,'' emotion,'' appetite,'' desire,'' senti-
ment ' all stand, in our author's terminology, for mental
systems. The term ' impulse ' is used in both senses, the
systematic and the abstract, since only certain impulses
seem to be systems, and it is often convenient to use the
term to indicate an aspect rather than a system. Thus we
speak conveniently of an emotional or instinctive impulse,
meaning here by ' impulse ' just the motor aspect of the
emotional system in question. Let us look a little closer
at this great dynamic, power: the emotional system. What
is. it that holds it together'? Where are we to look for the
binding force that gives it its unity and its uniqueness ?
Not in the feelings which colour it nor in the bodily sensa-
tions that accompany it. We must look for it in the pur-
posive end towards which all the impulses of the system con-
verge : it is this that organises and directs the system and gives
it its unity and its determinate character. If our emotional
activity has an inveterate tendency to organise itself it is
because it is not purposeless or rudderless, but, unconsciously
or consciously, works towards an innate or predetermined
end. The end of anger, that which appeases the angry im-
pulse and so brings it to an end, is the injury or destruction
of its object, or else the overcoming of some resistance which
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-obstructs it. The end of fear is the avoiding of danger, the
«nd of joy the maintenance of that which delights it, of
sorrow the restoration or redemption of that which has
been lost. Now it is this knowledge of the end of an
emotion which gives us the key for interpreting the sys-
tem. It is under the stress of the need to satisfy its end
that an emotion will draw into its service every serviceable
form of instinctive reaction, and these, however varied, will
all belong to the same system since they are directed to the
same end. However different is concealment and silence
from the cry for help, clinging or keeping close to something
from shrinking or starting back, immobility and the simula-
tion of death from mad precipitate night—yet as these are
all directed to the evading or averting of danger and betray
one and all an innate anxiety to avoid aggression, we recog-
nise them at once as the instinctive ways of fear.
Thus the whole instinctive process from start to finish,
from its excitation by certain stimuli to which it is innately
sensitive to its ultimate expression in various forms of hered-
itary behaviour belongs to the emotional system and subserves
its end. And this consideration compels us to recognise that
an emotional system is far more than a mere complex feeling,
far more even than anything of which we can be directly con-
scious : indeed if it is to comprehend and envelop the instinc-
tive processes which it claims, it must have its roots deep
in the body and be not only a psychical but a psycho-physical
system. Whatever tremors of nerve or contractions of muscle
stimulate or express the instinctive response belong to the
emotional system which that instinct subserves.
We have referred to the end of the emotion as the funda-
mental organising power of the system. It is the avoiding
of danger which is the mainspring of the emotional activi-
ties of fear, tbe maintenance of that which delights it the
mainspring of joy. Once the instinctive impulse towards
this end is aroused, the emotion will organise itself under
the direction of this impulse. Now it may happen that the
cause which arouses the emotion is also the object towards
which the emotion is directed, as when the sight of a bull
or a ghost as we come down the lane is at once the cause
and the object of our fear. In this case the emotion has a
definite basis in fact and it can work itself out to its final
end, whether through flight, concealment or bravado, in per-
fectly definite ways. But it will often happen that the emo-
tion is caused by bodily disturbances, and in this case the
cause of the emotion is not identical with the object towards
which the emotion is directed. The emotion is objectless
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though very real, and tbis objectless emotion is known as art
emotional mood. And since the end of an emotion is reached
much more easily and effectively when it has a definite object
about which to concentrate its energies, our emotional moods,
through the sheer necessity of finding some object, will tend
to fasten on to any frivolous pretext. We know how ridicu-
lously sensitive a man is when in an angry mood, and what
a small trifle will send us into raptures if our mood is joyous.
And if objects are not to hand, they will be invented to justify
the mood, and all thoughts or ideas congenial to the mood will
then be brought to play upon this object. For every emotional
system, we must remember, has its own characteristic men-
tality. Our ends determine not only the means1 we adopt to
•reach them but the ideas through which we think. Ajiger
will exclude all reasonable thoughts and all kindly thoughts
about its object, and the thoughts of fear though they may
seem more kindly are no more reasonable than those of
anger (p. 179). How often does our timidity prevent us
from thinking the right thing at the right time. We think
as our timidity allows us and not otherwise, and think clearly
and rightly only when the emotion is displaced by another
more cordial and more sincere, or subdued to the uses of
one of the great sentiments such as friendship, patriotism
or disinterested love. How sincerely in our reading or in
argument do we overlook or tend to overlook the point that
tells against us. How often is a writer accused of deliberately
ignoring certain facts which tell against his case when the
simple truth is that, unknown to himself, his covert fear of
these facts and their bearing on his case blinds him to their
very presence. He doesn't know that he is afraid of them
but he is. " Men mark when they hit," says Bacon, " but
never when they miss." Precisely. Joy emphasises the
successes and obliterates the failures just as a lover's joy in
his beloved will see all the virtues and miss all the defects.
We see in life what we are prepared to see, and what we
are prepared to see depends on our emotional temper. Only
those great organisers of our emotions, namely the senti-
ments, can help us to see life singly and to see it whole.
And what is true of the thought is true also of the will.
Only in and through the sentiments are resolutions formed
and definite choices made. There can be no self-control and
no steadfastness where the emotions of our own life have not
been organised within some inclusive passion, enthusiasm or
sentiment, and even then it is only the strong sentiment
which has a tendency to develop a strong will in its support.
" The weakness of so many minds," says Mr. Shand, " is
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either that they cannot love anything strongly and exclusively
enough to pursue it steadfastly, or that they are innately pre-
disposed to some discouraging emotion, as fear, or despon-
dency or sorrow, which they never learn to control. And
thus the strength or weakness of the will is largely due to
the sentiment in which it is organised, or to the direct in-
fluence of some emotion " (p. 66). Thus we are led towards
the sixth of the laws of mind which Shand puts forward as
" the working assumptions of our science," and formulates as
follows: "All intellectual and voluntary processes are elicited
by the system of some impulse, emotion or sentiment, and
subordinated to its end " (p. 67).
It would of course be quite impossible, within the limits
of an article, to consider in all its systematic rigour and
wealth of detail the varied systems of emotion which our
author passes in review. We propose therefore to restrict
ourselves to a single emotional system, the system of joy, to
discuss Mr. Shand's treatment of it and to venture some
criticisma
According to Mr. Shand, Joy is essentially a conservative
system. It is the emotion which expresses present satisfac-
tion with its object (p. 282). " Joy tends to maintain the
object itself as it i s" (p. 281), and not only this, but also
tends to maintain the self in its present relation to the object,
for if an object we are enjoying moves away, we follow it, if
not with our feet at least with our eyes, and if this is not
possible we detain an image or thought of it and rejoice in
secret over that Thus the fundamental end of joy is " to
maintain the situation which is the cause of joy so long as
the joy in it is felt" (p. 300). Are we enjoying rest? Our
tendency is to remain as we are: disturbance is resented,
and if the obstruction is serious or persistent our joy passes
off into anger, and into that form of anger of which the end
is to clear away the opposition and restore the old condition.
So, too, if we are enjoying a game: so long as we enjoy it we
do not wish to change i t And we know how children wish
to have repeated what they have enjoyed. It is indeed not
easy to realise that this impulse to maintain the object as it
is is the characteristic tendency of joy. For so long as our
enjoyment is not interfered with and no one seeks to with-
draw or change the object, we remain absorbed in the object
and do not question our impulse towards it. It is only
when this impulse is obstructed that we realise its existence.
And the unfortunate thing is that "in proportion to the
degree in which the impulse of joy is prominent in conscious-
ness is the emotion of joy destroyed " (p. 283). If we have
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to stop a game in order to argue with those who wish to see
it discontinued we lose our joy in it. With anger it is
different. Oppose the angry man and he becomes more
angry still; disturb somebody's enjoyment and he may
become angry but he will certainly become less joyful.
The reason is that joy rests in its object: it is nob strug-
gling to improve it or reform it or further it or defend it;
in any way. The emotion of joy is therefore incompatible
with the restless energies of criticism and ambition. The
ambitious man may halt from time to time as he mounts the
hill of life, and will rejoice in the progress he has made; but
even as he does this the fever of the impulse leaves him and
he is content to let the moments wait. When do we enjoy
a game most ? When we have so mastered its elements that
they give us no thought and we are free to abandon ourselves
to the zest of exercise. The feeling of striving must go if we
are to have genuine joy.
Let us turn by way of illustration to the behaviour of
play, and let us ask ourselves what light is shed on the
nature of play by what we have learnt of the system of
joy. Play is probably the most characteristic behaviour
of the system of joy, argues 8hand, and joy the very
spirit of play. It is therefore in play that we may expect to
see the emotion of joy in its purest form. Now the remark-
able thing about the play-impulse, and therefore, on Shand's
view, about joy itself also is that being directed to no serious
end of its own it can draw off into its own system in a spirit
of large catholicity all the instincts of all the emotional
systems. It can do this despite the fact that each of these
instincts has in its own system a peculiar function in many
respects antagonistic to the functions of other instincts in
other systems. And it is because the development of these
instincts in the play-system stops short at the point where
they might begin- to arouse their respective emotional feel-
ings and express themselves in work-a-day earnest that this
happy family of instincts can disport themselves so amicably
within a single system. When an animal or a boy goes out
to play he is neither hungry, nor angry, nor afraid, nor in-
clined to be disgusted with life nor stricken with sorrow;
nor is he burdened with that curiosity and wonder out of
which science and philosophy grow. Hence when instincts
of combat and flight and many others, after disconnexion
from their usual systems to whose end they are now no
longer subordinated enter the service of the play-system and
the emotion of joy, they adjust themselves to the end of this
new system. The exercise of each of these instincts be-
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comes in play an object of joy. " What we call play," says
Shand, " is only play inasmuch as the instincts called into
activity by it have become detached from the system of fear,
anger and appetite, and have become attached to joy and are
now exercised because their exercise arouses joy " (p. 292). In
the following illustration of animal play quoted by Bhand him-
self we see how distinct and yet how close are the serious and
the make-believe in play. A dog and a badger become play-
mates. "The essentials of the game were that the badger,
roaring and shaking his head like a wild boar, should
charge upon the dog, . . . and strike him in the side
with its head; the. dog, leaping dexterously entirely over
the badger, awaited a second and third attack, and then
made his antagonist chase him all round the garden. If the
badger managed to snap the dog's hind-quarters an ugly
tussle ensued, but never resulted in real fight If Caspar,
the badger, lost his temper he drew off without turning
round, and got up snorting and shaking and with bristling
hairs, and strutted about like an infuriated turkey-cock.
After a few moments his hair would smooth down, and with
some head-shaking and good-natured grunts the mad play
would begin again " (p. 296). Thus the serious manifesta-
tion of all grievous instincts is restrained within the limits
required by the end of joy which is just to play and play on
and nothing beyond. Control of instincts and other ten-
dencies can thus be acquired in play without the dangers
attending the full expression of these instincts within their
natural systems. And yet no one of these instincts is joy's
own instinct. They are all borrowed from other systems
and then stamped in play with the impress of joy.
We have seen that according to Bhand's interpretation of
joy, joy and desire are antagonistic systems. The one tends
to exclude the other. Let us consider more closely what this
view implies. And first as to the meaning of ' desire '. A
desire we find interpreted as an impulse which has foresight
of the end to be reached by it. The impulse apart from the
foresight is no more than a felt uneasiness, but when the
impulse, on being obstructed or delayed, develops its fore-
sight and becomes desire, there grow up out of this mixed
root of restlessness and prospectiveness a number of specific
emotions, emotions peculiar to desire, arising in its system
and nowhere else. Thus desire, we read, is " a very complex
emotional system which includes actually or potentially the
six prospective emotions of Hope, Anxiety, Disappointment,
Despondency, Confidence and Despair" (p. 463). Briefly it
is a system of definite prospective emotions. But though
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these six emotions are peculiar to thesemotional system of
desire, desire is not limited to these. It may organise and
utilise in the service of its special impulse any one of the
primary emotions with one single exception. That excep-
tion is Joy. " Not only does the restless Vtate of desire
exclude joy, but joy, the contemplative emotion, excludes
desire" (p. 509). Let us consider the two mah» classes of
joy: the joys of rest and the joys of action. The joys of
rest are of three kinds, the joy of attainment, the joy of
anticipation and the joy of retrospect. The joy of attain-
ment is an evanescent and transitional emotion. " I t is a
pause intervening between two restless processes, the de-
sire just satisfied and some new desire that takes its place."
But in itself it is a relief from desire and excludes it. The
joy of anticipation looks to the future as the joy of attainment
to the present, but it is no more part of desire than is the
joy of attainment. For like the latter it is a pause or inter-
ruption, a brief interval of day-dreaming and make-believe,
and as such a brief respite from the restlessness of desire.
The joy of retrospect looks to the past either in a contem-
plative way quite outside any system of desire, or as a halt
in the process of desire when a stage of the process is over
and fatigued nature bids us look round and take fresh heart
in from the progress we have made. Here again we have joy
the intervals of desire but never at its heart or in its system.
Turning now to the joys of activity, and considering their
relation to desire, we are met by the same evidences of mutual
antagonism between desire and joy. Either the desire is
serious or it is not. If serious, it excludes enjoyment except
at its pauses or terminations, i.e., when desire momentarily
or temporarily lapses. If the desire is not serious as in pure
sport, then, Shand admits, it need not interfere with our
enjoyment (p. 515). But then it is not a genuine desire
but a mere pretence. " The end of the game is, by play-
ing it according to fixed rules, to make more ' runs ' than
the opposite side, or to force the ball more frequently be-
tween the goal-posts, or to insert a ball successively into
eighteen holes in a fewer number of strokes than our op-
ponent." But " this end is a make-believe," and so there-
fore " is the desire for it ". It has at any rate none of the
restlessness of the genuine, typical desire, no eagerness to
reach the end and reach it as victors. On the contrary the
delays and uncertainties of the game are an additional at-
traction. " Thus," concludes our author, " the law that
desire and joy tend mutually to exclude one another ap-
pears to hold of all cases" (p. 517).
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The analysis of joy which we have just been considering,
including its relation to desire, is so clearly and ably de-
veloped by its author that it would be impossible not to
recognise its originality and its value. But it seems to me
to have one rather serious defect: it has neglected, or rather
failed to emphasise, an aspect of joy which, far from being
negligible, is of fundamental importance for the proper under-
standing of the system, and should, in my opinion, take the
place of the end which our author assigns distinctively to joy.
If we consider what joy means to the person who experi-
ences the joy, we shall find it difficult, I think, to attach
the same weight as does our author to the conservative
impulse of the emotion. Shand himself admits that this
impulse is hard to detect so long as the joy is active, but
springs into obviousness so soon as the joy is obstructed.
And then the joy tends to vanish, desire, anger or disgust
taking its place. This suggests that the impulse towards
retaining the object as it is and maintaining intact one's
own self-relation to the object may be the impulse not of
joy as such but of a desire springing from the heart of joy,
a desire which first finds itself explicitly when its latent im-
pulse is obstructed. If this interpretation is correct two
significant consequences follow. Desire finds a place in
the joy-system after all, and the joy-system itself must
find a new motive. Let us briefly consider these two
points in turn, starting with the latter. What, we ask,
IB the fundamental impulse of joy?
The fundamental and indigenous impulse of joy appears
to me to be the dynamic impulse of self-expression. An
emotion, says Shand, is " a self, or microcosm of the entire
mind" (p. 64). It is an embryonic personality and no-
where, it would seem, is the self-reference at once so inti-
mate and yet so unobtrusive as in the system of joy. Joy,
as we take it, is the emotion of self-enlargement, the great •
expansive emotion, and before it becomes the crowning emo-
tion of love it is already the distinctive emotion of our per-
sonal freedom.
This expansive tendency of joy reveals itself clearly in its
motor expression. I borrow the description from a work of
Fouillee's: " The features dilate, the eyebrows are arched,
•the mouth opens, the face too opens out, as it were, the
voice is louder and fuller, and one's gestures generally be-
come more ample and vivacious. The heart and lungs
•dilate, and the brain itself works more easily and rapidly.
There is increase of mental animation, sympathetic feeling
and good-will in all that is said and done. The expression of
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pure joy in a word is the expression of liberty and therefore
of liberality" (Iddes-Forces, 1., p. 155). And if we turn to
the play-system we find the same note of vital expansion
and free expression. Not conservation but abandonment is
here the dominating impulse. We give ourselves up to the
game. It may be in a spirit of relief from pressure, of re-
action from the earnestness of life, as when the city man
on a Saturday afternoon forgets himself and his work on
the river or at golf, and throws all his cares to the winds.
Or it may be, as it more often is with the child and adol-
escent, in a spirit of spontaneous recreation which requires
no background of earnest endeavour to give it zest and vi-
tality. Or it may be, and thiB is perhaps the profoundest
play-impulse of all, in a spirit of pure creativeness. Here
the joy of play is the joy of the child when the child is in
earnest and the joy of the genius when his spirit is at play:
what Groos has called the joy of being a cause. Liberation,
recreation, creation, these are all forms of self-abandonment,
aspects of that emotional impulse towards freedom which
we call Joy.
Assuming then that self-expression is the characteristic
impulse of joy as a primary emotion, we may further ask :
What then is its relation to desire? Accepting Shand's
definition of desire as an impulse that has foresight of the
end to be reached by it, we readily admit that there are joys,
and among these the most pure as well as the most primitive,
where there is no such foresight of an end to be reached, no
movement towards an end, and therefore no desire. There
is the joy we have in being alive at all, the mere joy of living,
' the leaping from rock to rock," the joy in activity as such,
apart from all question as to whether it is successful or not.
Here we have attainment unpreceded by any anticipation,
being dissociated from all purposive doing. There are joys
such as those of vision which can express themselves simul-
taneously in the present and perfect tense, which can say at
once " I enjoy" and " I have enjoyed ". They are as com-
plete now as they were, and as complete then as they are
now. They are the joys of pure fruition: they satisfy us
from the outset, and in such a system all active desire is
superfluous. In these cases the conservative impulse may
well be the instinctive impulse of joy as such. But there
are other joys, and it is not enough to call these the joys of
activity, as though all activity were mere pursuing: they are
the joys of " progressive attainment". Here there is at the
heart of the joy a strain of desire: the end is desired but not
apart from the means or the way that leads to it, it is desired
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as the culminating point in a progress. " The man who
enjoys the ascent," says Prof. Mackenzie in developing this
very point (Manual of Ethics, 1st ed., p. 118), " ia the one who
desires the end only in so far as it gives unity and complete-
ness to the process of attaining i t " For such a man joy is
set in a framework of desire.
Our point then is that these joys of progressive attainment
are noi antagonistic to desire. There are joys which consort
with serious desires, joys that haunt us in our work, and far
from bringing the work to pause stimulate us from their first
inception; there are joys of aspiration as well as joys of
elemental liberty, joys in which the desire after an ideal is
from the start instinct with the presence of that which it
desires to reach, joys which are fruition in action, rest in
movement, satisfaction in desire. In joys such as these,
where all desire is progressive realisation and all pursuit a
progressive attainment, we escape from the old dreary round
of painful want, desire and pleasurable excitement followed
by satiety and further want: this was the wheel of desire
from which Epicurean and Buddhist have sought release in
arapai-uL or Nirvana, freedom from care or from desire. In
progressive attainment we find our rest in and through our
action, and our joy in and through our desire and aspiration.
The case for such a reconciliation between joy and desire
as we have just briefly sketched out seems strengthened by
the consideration that if joy is antagonistic to the system of
desire, it must also be antagonistic to the system of sorrow.
For our sorrows are often aching wants shot through with
desire for that which is absent. But if sorrow is of the
essence of desire, so that desire may be said to be born within
its system, then, if Shand is correct, sorrow should be
antagonistic to joy. But this Shand does not admit: it is
repugnance and disgust which are the opposites of joy, not
sorrow. Moreover no conclusion could be more contrary either
to human experience or to sane psychological analysis than
the conclusion that sorrow is alien to joy.
The analysis of our emotional experience shows indeed
that sorrow and joy are most intimately related. Our
sweetest songs would cloy but for the strain of sorrow in
them. It is through suffering that our joy wins its depth,
its insight and its serenity. We have seen that the stability
of pure joy depends on its not being obstructed. Obstructed,
it turns towards anger or towards fear. We come down
some morning in a joyful temper and meet some one who
had got out of bed from the wrong side : in a moment we are
ruffled or irritated, we shut up like a sensitive plant in dis-
4 0 W. B. BOTCB GIBSON :
guat and realise how frail a flower is the joy that dies with its
own gladness. But if we examine ourselves more closely
we find that the joy, surface-rooted as it was, has not lost
its best Hold on the soil of our mind. It survives in trans-
figured shapes as an impulse of restoration: an impulse it
may be of minimal emotional feeling but with clearly marked
tendency and end. And that impulse of restoration is sorrow
seeking to recover what joy has lost.
Let us note how sorrow strengthens joy. Most obviously
of course by tending to restore it. If the swift-winged joy
left us regretless, and there was no impulse to ' recapture
the first fine careless rapture'—if joy did not leave sorrows
behind it to carry on its work, it could never have become,
as it has become, the central emotion of love and the most
enduring of all the emotions. But it is because this sorrow
with its redeeming tendency is not sorrow in general but
the sorrow of the joy, the lost joy's own sorrow, that it is
best able to help the joy. Sorrow does not forget her line-
age or prove an unfaithful daughter. On the contrary she
concentrates herself on recovering the joy native to the one
particular system in which she has been born. If a child's
toy is broken how is the flown joy easiest recovered ? Not
by purchasing a new toy but by patching up the old one.
The mother who when her children are safe in bed awaiting
the coming of Santa Klaus, slips into the nursery with a pot
of glue and other restoratives is not only economical but
wise. 8he knows that to solder an old joy with sorrow
is more strengthening to human nature than to create a
new joy.
Here—so our author would tell us—" we see the wisdom
of sorrow in refusing consolation according to the way of
the world " (p. 366). Bachel weeps for her children and
will not be consoled. Such sorrow rejects the joy of any
system but its own, and if the sorrow is extreme it even
tends to destroy the very capacity for joy which is inherent
in these alien systems. Out of such concentration of impulse
the welded system of joy and sorrow acquires a greater depth
and a far greater constancy. We have joy in a friend and he
leaves us. " The magic light dies off at once from bower
and hall," and yet it does not altogether disappear. It
roams mysteriously through the twilight of absence, per-
sisting through the long shadow of separation like the
light of an old-world night of June waiting for the day's
return. It is in the aftermath of sorrow, if I may shift the
metaphor, that we learn the value of joy's rich harvests and
with pitiful regret recall the unharvested joys. And when
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-the friend returns, our joy is the richer for the sorrow that
h*a moulded it in absence, and by saving it from forgetful-
ness, brought in, however faintly, the eternal note.
The conclusion to which the foregoing analysis seems to
point is that the emotion of joy, whether we consider it in
itself or in its relation to sorrow, is in all oar progressive
activities at any rate closely related to the system of desire,
and therefore intrinsically not antagonistic to desire. Joy
is the emotion proper to the activities in which our sense
of freedom finds self-expression, and whatever desires grow
-out of such activity far from discarding joy clothe themselves
in it. If our view be correct, then a certain modification is
-called for both of Mr. Shand's conception of the fundamental
tendency of joy, and also of his view as to the relation be-
tween joy and desire. In particular it will not be possible
to conceive of the system of joy as intrinsically antagonistic
to that of desire.
In bidding leave of this subject let me refer once- more to
the book we have taken as our text. Much of it has been
passed over in silence, and even where we have expanded
it has been impossible to do justice to the richness of the
material. The Foundation* is a book to be read and re-read :
a book to be studied till the various parts stand out in dis-
tinct and permanent relief. Only then will it be possible to
•consider it justly and as a whole and apply it fruitfully to
the Ethics of Character. When such applications become
{practicable and Mr. Shand's work has been brought intoine with Evolutionary Ethics, the Pathology of Human
Feeling and Character, and last, but not least, a Philosophy
of Personality and Freedom, great results should follow. At
present we are only at the beginning of the end.
